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Iowa Law Review, forthcoming in Volume 90, Issue 4 (2005)
THE EFFECTS OF JURY IGNORANCE ABOUT DAMAGE
CAPS: THE CASE OF THE 1991 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT
Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff† & Matthew T. Bodie‡
INTRODUCTION
The way that juries determine damages has always been a
mystery worth investigating.1
Particularly intriguing are the
deliberations that lead to million or even billion-dollar verdicts.2 The
awe-inspiring breadth of these verdicts—even if they are short-lived—
has provoked an independent political movement to curb their excesses.3
Yet simultaneous with this concern over the runaway jury is a
fundamental desire to protect the integrity of the jury process and
maintain respect for the jury’s function and decisions. The concurrent
desires to exalt and to rein in the jury come face-to-face in laws aimed at
capping the damages that a jury can award in a civil case. Damage cap
statutes expressly limit the power of the jury to provide monetary relief
to plaintiffs.4 At the same time, some statutes, case law, and
†
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Law, and members of the New York University School of Law Lawyering Program
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1
See Robert MacCoun, Inside the Black Box: What Empirical Research Tells Us
About Decisionmaking by Civil Juries, in VERDICT: ASSESSING THE CIVIL JURY SYSTEM
137 (Robert E. Litan ed., 1993).
2
See, e.g., Engle v. RJ Reynolds Tobacco, No. 94-08273 CA-22, 2000 WL
33534572 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Nov. 6, 2000) (jury verdict awarding $145 billion in punitive
damages), rev’d sub nom. Liggett Group, Inc. v. Engle, 853 So.2d 434 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2003).
3
See Terry Carter, It’s B-a-a-a-ck: With Republicans in Charge, Will Tort Reform
Finally Have Its Day?, 46 ABA JOURNAL E-REPORT 3, 3 (December 6, 2002) (“Most
talked about [potential Congressional tort reforms] are legislative proposals concerning
asbestos litigation, medical malpractice liability, class action venues and perhaps some
limitations on punitive damages.”).
4
See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 6-11-21 (2000). For a discussion of the reforms enacted
in 1986 by roughly sixty percent of states, see Nancy L. Manzer, Note, 1986 Tort
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commentators suggest that informing the jury of the caps threatens the
integrity of the jury decision-making process.5 The 1991 Civil Rights
Act offers one such statutory example of an effort to protect defendants
from more expensive jury awards while concurrently attempting to
maintain the “integrity” of these awards.
Prior to the 1991 Civil Rights Act, plaintiffs bringing federal
employment discrimination claims were entitled only to the most basic
relief: reinstatement and back wages, reduced by interim earnings that
had or should have been earned.6 Judges awarded this equitable relief,
rather than juries; plaintiffs were not entitled to a jury trial.7 The 1991
Act changed all this, and in so doing has been recognized as a watershed
moment in employment discrimination litigation.8 Now, either party
may demand a trial by jury.9 And instead of simply seeking
reinstatement and back pay, plaintiffs can demand compensatory
damages for future pecuniary losses, as well as emotional pain, suffering,
inconvenience, and other non-pecuniary losses.10 Additionally, if the
defendant acted with malice or reckless indifference, the plaintiff may
recover punitive damages.11 These new damages radically improved the
potential relief available to federal employment discrimination plaintiffs,
opening up the possibility for much larger judgments.
These pro-plaintiff changes were mitigated somewhat by caps on
punitive and compensatory damages.12 These caps are scaled according
to the size of the defendant-employer and are unrelated to the severity of
the offense.13 Such caps are not unique; a number of other statutes
expressly limit the recovery of damages to a set or formulated
Reform Legislation: A Systematic Evaluation of Caps on Damages and Limitations on
Joint and Several Liability, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 628 (1988).
5
See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(c)(2); Sasaki v. Class, 92 F.3d 232 (4th Cir. 1996);
Michael S. Kang, Comment, Don't Tell Juries About Statutory Damage Caps: The
Merits of Non-Disclosure, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 469, 470 (1999).
6
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (2000).
7
Id. §2000e-5(f)(4).
8
See, e.g., Susan Sturm, Lawyers and the Practice of Workplace Equity, 2002 WIS.
L. REV. 277, 279 (noting that “the 1991 amendments to the Civil Rights Act of 1964
attracted to the practice of employment law a new generation of lawyers, who approach
employment litigation like personal injury cases”).
9
42 U.S.C. § 1981a(c)(1) (2000).
10
Id. § 1981a(b)(3).
11
Id. § 1981a(b)(1).
12
Id. § 1981a(b)(3).
13
Combined compensatory and punitive damages cannot exceed $50,000 if the
employer has 100 or fewer employees, $100,000 for employers with 100 to 200
employees, $200,000 for employers with 200 to 500 employees, and $300,000 for
employers with more than 500 employees. See id. These numbers do not, however,
include any back pay that the jury awards.
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maximum.14 Caps are part of an overall movement to reform the tort
system, typically supported by those who believe that the civil legal
system unfairly burdens society by levying massive damage awards.15
In an interesting twist, the 1991 Act also expressly required that
“the court shall not inform the jury of the limitations [on damages].”16
Thus, when called upon to measure damages in federal employment
discrimination cases, juries are expected to make their calculations
without knowing the ultimate limit that the caps impose. The cap nondisclosure clause has been touted as a method of maintaining the
“integrity” of jury damages calculations: if informed of the caps, jurors
could purposely attempt to evade them or might be unconsciously biased
by the cap number.17 A variety of others, including courts and
commentators, have suggested that non-disclosure of damage caps, more
generally, should be the rule whenever a damage cap exists.18
However, this effort to preserve a jury’s decision-making
integrity by not discussing the caps forces courts and attorneys to
conceal the true state of the law and may exact a toll on public
confidence in the justice system. This article explores the potential
broad effects on the jury system of the failure to disclose damage caps.
In order to better understand the context of disclosure versus nondisclosure, we first examine the psychological effects that knowledge, as
opposed to ignorance, of the caps could have on jury decision-making
processes and damage awards. We then turn to an examination of the
potential effects that ignorance of the caps may have on perceptions of
the legal process. Ultimately, we conclude that despite the effects that
knowledge of the caps may have on a jury’s damages award, jurors
should be informed of the caps, both to retain public confidence in the
14

See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 11-108(b) (2004); TEX. CIV.
PRAC. & REM. § 41.008 (Vernon 2004); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.15 (Michie 2004).
15
Commentators suggest that such tort damage awards pass along great costs to
ordinary citizens. For example, Albert Yoon suggests that medical malpractice
produces an astronomical amount of costs—between $17 and $29 billion per year.
Albert Yoon, Damage Caps and Civil Litigation: An Empirical Study of Medical
Malpractice Litigation in the South, 27 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 199, 200 (2001).
16
42 U.S.C. § 1981a(c)(2).
17
Kang, supra note 5, at 470.
18
Id. at 478–79; see also American College of Trial Lawyers Committee on
Special Problems in the Administration of Justice, Report on Punitive Damages 15
(1989), available at http://www.actl.com/PDFs/ReportOnPunitiveDamages.pdf;
Thomas v. Sanford, 663 S.W.2d 932, 935 (Ark. 1984); State v. Bouras, 423 N.E.2d
741, 744 (Ind. App. 1981). But see Evans v. Avery, 100 F.3d 1033, 1040 (1st Cir.
1996) (finding no abuse of discretion in informing jurors about a Massachusetts state
cap); Vendrell v. School District, 360 P.2d 282, 292 (Or. 1961) (holding that jury must
be informed of state statutory limit on recovery against school district).
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justice system and to give jurors guidance in making the proper damages
determination. It may seem remarkable to advocate providing jurors
with information that has the potential, in light of knowledge of
psychological decision-making principles, to “taint” their ultimate
decisions. However, procedural justice concerns make clear that
withholding this information has the potential to taint the legitimacy of
the jury system as a whole.
In Part I, we discuss the legislative history and judicial
interpretation of the cap non-disclosure clause, with an eye toward the
purpose behind the clause. In Part II, we discuss the potential effects of
disclosure and non-disclosure of the cap on jury damage awards in light
of psychological models of decision-making. In Part III, we discuss
potential effects of the concealed cap on perceptions of the justice
system, in particular examining procedural justice effects. Finally, in
Part IV, we argue for a system of disclosure that would use the caps to
guide jurors to the correct assessment of compensatory and punitive
damages.
I
NON-DISCLOSURE OF THE CAPS:
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION
The 1991 Civil Rights Act is a many-faceted piece of legislation,
dealing with issues such as disparate impact claims,19 the “business
necessity” defense,20 and the right to a jury trial.21 The Act followed in
the wake of several Supreme Court decisions that curtailed or eliminated
the rights and remedies available to victims of employment
discrimination.22 One of Congress’s primary goals was to reverse these
decisions directly by rewriting the civil rights statutes.23 However, the
Act cited an additional purpose to “provide appropriate remedies for
19

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (2000).
Id. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i).
21
Id. § 1981a(c)(1).
22
Ronald D. Rotunda, The Civil Rights Act of 1991: A Brief Introductory Analysis
of the Congressional Response to Judicial Interpretation, 68 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 923,
924 (1993).
23
Civil Rights Act of 1991, 105 Stat. 1071, § 3. For example, the Act specifically
restores the definitions of such statutory terms as “business necessity” and “job related”
to the Court’s definitions as they existed prior to the decision in Wards Cove Packing
Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989). 105 Stat. 1071, § 3(2); see also id. § 3(4) (noting
that another purpose is “to respond to recent decisions of the Supreme Court by
expanding the scope of relevant civil rights statutes in order to provide adequate
protection to victims of discrimination”).
20
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intentional discrimination and unlawful harassment in the workplace.”24
The Act did this by allowing federal employment discrimination
plaintiffs to recover compensatory and punitive damages for the first
time.25 Punitive damages were only allowed when the plaintiff
demonstrated that the employer had engaged in the discriminatory
practice “with malice or reckless indifference” to the plaintiff’s civil
rights.26 In addition, the Act placed a limit on the total compensatory
and punitive damages that each plaintiff could receive.27 The actual
damage cap was based on the number of employees working for the
employer; the cap began at $50,000 for employers with less than 101
employees, and rose to $300,000 for employers with more than 500
employees.28 However, the Act specified that if the case was tried before
a jury (a new possibility created by the Act itself), and the plaintiff
sought compensatory or punitive damages, “the court shall not inform
the jury of the limitations described [above].”29
In order to dissect the purpose of this non-disclosure provision,
we begin below by discussing the legislative intent as manifested in the
legislative history of the provision. We then turn to how courts have
interpreted the provision, including its secondary effects.
A. Legislative History: Lost in the Shuffle
Like prior civil rights statutes, the 1991 Civil Rights Act was
passed only after taking a circuitous and controversial path.30 As noted
above, the 1988 Supreme Court term saw a number of controversial
decisions that cut back on the protections provided by federal
employment discrimination law, particularly Title VII of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act. In response to these decisions, the House of Representatives
approved H.R. 4000, entitled the Civil Rights Act of 1990. The bill
24

Id. § 3(1).
42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(1) (2000) (providing that “the complaining party may
recover compensatory and punitive damages”).
26
Id. § 1981a(b)(1).
27
Id. § 1981a(b)(3). The Supreme Court has determined that “front pay”—namely,
money awarded for lost compensation during the period between judgment and
reinstatement (or in lieu of reinstatement)—is not considered compensatory damages
and is thus not covered by the cap. Pollard v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 532 U.S.
843, 852 (2001).
28
42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3). The Act counted employees as those having worked
“in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year.” Id.
29
Id. § 1981a(c)(2).
30
See Nicole L. Gueron, Note, An Idea Whose Time Has Come: A Comparative
Procedural History of the Civil Rights Act of 1960, 1964, and 1991, 104 YALE L.J.
1201, 1203 (1995) (citing 136 Cong. Rec. H6810-13 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 1990)).
25
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provided for substantial amendments of the federal law of employment
discrimination, including compensatory and punitive damages for
victims of intentional discrimination.31 During congressional debate, the
bill received criticism for its uncapped damages provisions.32 An
identical bill was proposed in the Senate and was reported favorably out
of committee.33 However, the bill was later amended to add a $150,000
cap to compensatory and punitive damages.34 The House and Senate
passed the bill as amended, but President Bush vetoed it.35 An attempt to
override the veto failed by one vote in the Senate.36
The House bill was resubmitted with minor changes in 1991 as
H.R. 1, the “Civil Rights and Women’s Equity in Employment Act.”37
According to the House Report, one of the bill’s two primary purposes
was “to strengthen existing protections and remedies available under
federal civil rights laws to provide more effective deterrence and
adequate compensation for victims of discrimination.”38 Noting that
compensatory and punitive damages were available under 42 U.S.C. §
1981 for victims of intentional race discrimination, the report noted that
a “serious gap” existed for victims of intentional discrimination on the
basis of sex or religion.39 As did the 1990 bill, H.R. 1 provided for
uncapped compensatory and punitive damages.40 The House Report
dismissed concerns about excessive verdicts by noting that “juries are
fully capable of determining whether an award of damages is appropriate
and if so, how large it must be to compensate the plaintiff adequately and
31

H.R. Res. 4000 § 8, 101st Cong. (1990).
See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 102-40 (II), at 71 (May 17, 1991), reprinted in 1991
U.S.C.C.A.N. 757 (“You can show people all the studies that reveal that punitive
damage awards in the past have not been for astronomical amounts ... But I can tell you
that it is small comfort if you are on the receiving end of a lawsuit where the allegation
is for say $3 or $4 million in punitive damages. That is your exposure. When somebody
files a lawsuit against you and they say, ‘I am entitled to $10,000 in compensatory
damages and $5 million in punitive damages,’ it will ruin your whole night's sleep.”
(quoting Sen. Dale Bumpers)).
33
S. 2104 (101st Cong. 1990); S. Rep. No. 101-315 (1990).
34
Gueron, supra note 30, at 1203 (citing 136 Cong. Rec. H6810-13 (daily ed. Aug.
2, 1990)).
35
Gueron, supra note 30, at 1203; Roger Clegg, An Introduction: A Brief
Legislative History of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 54 LA. L. REV. 1459, 1465 (1994).
36
Gueron, supra note 30, at 1203; Clegg, supra note 35, at 1465.
37
H.R. 1, 102d Cong. (1991).
38
H.R. Rep. No. 102-40 (II) 1 (May 17, 1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N.
694. The other purpose was to "respond to the Supreme Court's recent decisions by
restoring the civil rights protections that were dramatically limited by those decisions."
Id.
39
Id. at 24, reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 717.
40
See H.R. 1 § 206, 102d Cong. (1991).
32
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to deter future repetition of the prohibited conduct.”41 The minority
report, however, feared that uncapped damages would lead to “a
litigation generating machine” with “huge awards” in the millions of
dollars.42
H.R. 1 was amended in June 1991 to include a cap on punitive
damages, but compensatory damages remained uncapped.43 The House
approved the bill as amended, but the Senate never voted on it. Instead,
the Senate passed its own version, which included both the caps and the
non-disclosure requirement. The House eventually approved the Senate
version, which President Bush signed into law. At the signing, the
President said the following about the caps contained in the bill:
Another important source of the controversy that delayed
enactment of this legislation was a proposal to authorize jury
trials and punitive damages in cases arising under Title VII. S.
1745 adopts a compromise under which ‘caps’ have been
placed on the amount that juries may award in such cases. The
adoption of these limits on jury awards sets an important
precedent, and I hope to see this model followed as part of an
initiative to reform the Nation's tort system.44

Soon after the 1991 Civil Rights Act was signed into law, the “Equal
Remedies Act of 1991” was proposed in the Senate.45 The bill would
have removed the damage caps and the non-disclosure provision from
the code.46 However, it failed to pass.47
41

H.R. Rep. No. 102-40 (I) 72 (April 24, 1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N.

610.
42

H.R. Rep. No. 102-40 (II) 143, 153 (May 17, 1991), reprinted in 1991
U.S.C.C.A.N. 672, 682.
43
137 Cong. Rec. H3922, H3924 (June 5, 1991). The cap limited punitive
damages to $150,000 or the sum of compensatory and equitable relief awarded
(whichever was greater).
44
1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 768, 769 (Nov. 21, 1991).
45
S. 2062 (102d Cong. Nov. 26, 1991).
46
The committee report on the bill argued that the removal of the caps was
necessary to insure that women, religious minorities, and people with disabilities had
the same access to damages as racial and ethnic minorities. S. Rep. No. 102-286, at 5
(1992) (“Congress has created a system which values injuries suffered by women,
people with disabilities, and certain religious minorities less than the same injuries
suffered by racial or ethnic minorities.”). According to the report, Congress accepted
the restrictions on damages “[i]n the interest of securing prompt passage of the Civil
Rights Act of 1991, including the portion guaranteeing the right to damages,” and “left
to 1992 the task of providing full, fair, and equal remedies for victims of
discrimination.” Id. at 3. The committee minority, however, noted that the caps were
“part of the compromise on last year's civil rights legislation approved overwhelmingly
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The legislative history of the 1991 Civil Rights Act contains little
specific discussion of the non-disclosure requirement. One reason may
be that the House Report was prepared for a bill that did not have
statutory damage caps, let alone a non-disclosure provision.48 However,
Senator John Danforth, one of the Senate bill's co-sponsors and reputedly
the driving force behind the final compromise bill,49 did provide this
discussion on jury discretion and knowledge of the caps: “[T]he bill
specifically provides that the jury shall not be informed of the existence or
amount of the caps on damage awards. Thus, no pressure, upward or
downward, will be exerted on the amount of jury awards by the existence of the
50
statutory limitations.”

The effects of the cap, according to Senator Danforth, thus
appear to be the potential for “pressure” to move damages “upward or
downward” from where they would have been without disclosure of the
cap. Senator Danforth does not explain why this pressure is to be
avoided, or whether damages are more likely to be moved upward or
downward if the caps were to be revealed.
There appears to have been little investigation by Congress into
the potential effects that hiding the caps would have, not only on jury
awards but also on jurors, judges, and attorneys. While the wisdom of
cap non-disclosure was lost in the shuffle of legislative compromise,
courts have been left to determine the scope and legal effect of the nondisclosure provision.
B. Judicial Interpretation: Integrity vs. Reallocation
Although other provisions of the 1991 Act have received
extensive judicial exegesis, the cap non-disclosure provision has gotten
only limited attention. The non-disclosure provision has arisen in two
contexts, one which involves the provision directly and the other which
involves an indirect consequence of the provision. These contexts are
considered below.
by the House of Representatives and the Senate.” Id. at 20. The minority argued that
capped damages represented "a significant expansion of the remedies” provided under
Title VII, and “unrestricted damages will lead to a litigation explosion [and will] result
in excessive damage awards that may be harmful to the financial health of the firm.”
Id. at 21.
47
Two bills in the prior Congress proposed to eliminate the caps on compensatory
and punitive damages. See S. 2088 § 532 (108th Cong. Feb. 12, 2004); H.R. 3809 § 532
(108th Cong. Feb. 11, 2004).
48
See H.R. Rep. No. 102-40 (I) 64-65 (April 24, 1991), reprinted in 1991
U.S.C.C.A.N. 602-03.
49
See Clegg, supra note 35, at 1469–70.
50
137 Cong. Rec. S15484 (daily ed. Oct. 30, 1991) (Sen. Danforth).
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1. Direct context: Who can tell the jury what?
The § 1981a non-disclosure provision states that “the court shall
not inform the jury” about the statutory cap.51 Read literally, the
provision would seem to prohibit only judges from explaining or
discussing the damages limitations. In Sasaki v. Class,52 however, the
Fourth Circuit held that attorneys were also prohibited from disclosing
the cap, or its effects, to jurors.53 The plaintiff in Sasaki brought suit
against the employer alleging sexual harassment under Title VII as well
as assault and battery under state tort law.54 During his closing
argument, plaintiff’s counsel indicated to the jury that it could award the
plaintiff “up to $50,000” in compensatory damages on the sexual
harassment claim, and “up to $500,000” on the state tort claim.55 While
counsel did not explicitly inform the jury about the caps, he did contrast
the two different claims and noted that the state law damage provision
“is generous here.”56 Ultimately, the jury awarded Plaintiff $61,250 in
damages on the sexual harassment claim,57 $150,000 in compensatory
damages on the state law claim, and $65,000 in punitive damages.58
The Fourth Circuit determined that counsel had violated 42
U.S.C. § 1981a(c)(2) by revealing the existence of the caps to the jury.59
The court acknowledged that the statute literally only prohibits the
“court” from informing the jury about the caps.60 However, it held that
“Congress clearly intended this restriction to prohibit anyone from
bringing the caps to the jury’s attention.”61 In discussing the purpose of
the provision, the court cited Senator Danforth’s argument that the nondisclosure clause would eliminate the potential for the caps to exert
“pressure, upward or downward” on damages.62 Noting that the caps
themselves were “enacted in apparent response to a concern about
runaway verdicts,” the court posited that the non-disclosure clause was
51

42 U.S.C. § 1981a(c)(2) (2000).
92 F.3d 232 (4th Cir. 1996).
53
Id. at 234.
54
Id. at 235.
55
Id. at 235–36.
56
Id. at 236.
57
This amount fell below the cap, as plaintiff was awarded $11,250 in back pay,
which is not counted against the cap.
58
Id.
59
Id.
60
Id.
61
Id.
62
Id.
52
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enacted “because ‘legislators would likely fear that juries would award
the maximum or would otherwise adjust their awards if told of the
statutory limit.’”63 The court found strong reason to believe that the jury
had, in fact, tailored its damages verdict to circumvent the cap.
Although the acts covered by the state tort claims (unwanted touching)
were included within the sexual harassment claim, the jury awarded
almost three times the damages for that claim. Moreover, the jury
adhered to plaintiff’s counsel’s suggested damages on the harassment
claim by not going above counsel’s suggested maximum. The court
found that the jury “appears to have faithfully followed [plaintiff’s]
counsel’s directions” and “almost undoubtedly adjusted its award to
account for the federal cap.”64 According to the court, “[t]he jury here
likely reacted in precisely the manner that Congress specifically feared,
and which it attempted to preclude through the enactment of 42 U.S.C. §
1981a.”65 Finding that counsel’s statement was not harmless error, the
court remanded for a new trial on damages.66
In an unpublished opinion, the Sixth Circuit agreed with Sasaki’s
conclusion that the cap non-disclosure clause extends to counsel as well
as the courts.67 However, the court found that counsel’s reference was
harmless, because there was “no indication it had any effect on the jury’s
award.”68 The jury awarded $300,000 in punitive damages, the statutory
maximum, on plaintiff’s gender discrimination claim—her only claim.
The court reasoned that the jury’s knowledge of the caps did not change
its award:
From a practical standpoint, if the jury felt [defendant’s]
conduct warranted less than $300,000 in punitive damages,
there is no reason to believe the mention of the limit on
punitive damages would have caused the jury to increase the
award. If the jury believed that [defendant’s] conduct
warranted more than $300,000, its knowledge of the cap did
nothing more than limit the jury’s award to the lesser amount,
which the district court would have done in any event had the
63

Id. at 237 (quoting Colleen P. Murphy, Determining Compensation: The Tension
Between Legislative Power and Jury Authority, 74 TEX. L. REV. 345, 347 n.8 (1995)).
64
Sasaki, 92 F.3d at 237.
65
Id.
66
Id. at 243.
67
Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n v. EMC Corp., 205 F.3d 1339 (Table),
2000 WL 191819 (6th Cir. Feb. 8, 2000). Interestingly, the reference to the caps was
made by an attorney for the EEOC. See id. at *8 (noting that EEOC counsel said to the
jury that $300,000 was “the most we can ask for” and “[i]f we could, we would ask for
a lot more”).
68
Id. at *9.
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jury returned a larger verdict.69

The dissenting judge disagreed, however:
An inescapable inherent risk exists that the jurors in this case
experienced pressure to award $300,000 in punitive damages,
instead of a lesser sum, in response to a misconceived
perception that Congress had foreordained that an employer of
[defendant’s] size which satisfied the requisites for punitive
liability . . . should be punished in the amount of $300,000.70

As these divergent opinions show, judges have intuitive—and conflicting
—notions about the effects that knowledge of the caps may have,
ranging from (1) the caps will have no effect to (2) jurors will
misunderstand the caps to (3) jurors will understand and circumvent the
caps.
Although courts have disagreed on the likely effects of the nondisclosure clause, there is agreement that the statutory caps do not affect
the amount of damages that a plaintiff may request from the jury, in part
because of the non-disclosure provision. In a number of cases,
defendants argued that the court should strike down plaintiffs’ prayers
for relief because these prayers exceeded the statutorily-provided
damage limitations.71 However, courts have rejected this argument on
the basis of the non-disclosure provision. By forcing plaintiffs to limit
their claims to the statutory cap, a court “would in effect inform the jury
of the damage caps.”72 One court also suggested that forcing a plaintiff
to request only the capped amount would hinder the plaintiff’s ability to
demonstrate “the relative importance of her different damages claims,”
thereby impairing the plaintiff’s credibility.73 Instead, courts have
determined that the proper procedure is to allow the plaintiff to request
69

Id. The court also noted that since the employer had failed to object at trial when
the statutory limit was mentioned, the employer had the burden of showing that
counsel’s conduct was “outrageous” or “egregious.” Id. at *8.
70
Id. at *15 (Krupansky, J., dissenting).
71
See, e.g., Johnson v. Metropolitan Sewer Dist., 926 F. Supp. 874, 876 (E.D.
Minn. 1996); Beam v. Concord Hospitality, Inc., 1996 WL 455020, at *5 (D. Kan. July
8, 1996); Solomon v. Godwin & Carlton, P.C., 898 F. Supp. 415, 416 (N.D. Tex. 1995);
Haltek v. Village of Park Forest, 864 F. Supp. 802, 807 (N.D. Ill. 1994).
72
Haltek, 864 F. Supp. at 807; see also Johnson, 926 F. Supp. at 876; Beam, 1996
WL 455020 at *6; Solomon, 898 F. Supp. at 417. It is unclear whether these courts
were suggesting that (1) plaintiffs would be entitled to explain their damages award,
thereby exposing the damage cap, or (2) jurors would intuit the presence of a cap by the
clipped nature of plaintiff’s prayer for relief.
73
Beam, 1996 WL 455020 at *6.
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an unlimited amount and then to reduce the actual damages awarded if
they rise above the cap.74
2. Indirect effects: How should damages be apportioned between federal
and state claims?
Federal antidiscrimination protections such as Title VII are not
the only employment discrimination statutes available to employees.
States and localities also provide statutory antidiscrimination protections,
and federal provisions do not preempt these protections.75 States are
even permitted to go beyond the federal provisions in their coverage or
relief.76 These provisions may seem superfluous if a plaintiff is
protected by a federal statute, but many of these statutes provide for
uncapped compensatory and/or punitive damages.77 Because of this
potential difference, a plaintiff may be entitled to significantly lower
relief under the federal statute than under the state or local statute.
Given the potential for different relief for the same underlying
offense, judges and juries must grapple with how to apportion relief
between the capped federal statute and an uncapped state statute. The
Sasaki case provides an illustration of this. In Sasaki, the plaintiff
brought a federal claim (capped at $50,000) and a state tort claim
(capped at $500,000) based on the same underlying sexual harassment.78
The plaintiff’s attorney suggested to the jury that it award the maximum
amount under the federal claim, and then provide for further damages
under the state claim.79 And as the court noted, the jury appeared to
follow these instructions, awarding the statutory maximum on the federal
claim and $215,000 in compensatory and punitive damages on the state
claim.80 The Sasaki court believed that the non-disclosure provision
was designed to prevent such award structuring.81 According to the
court, such award shifting was what “Congress specifically feared” about
74

Johnson, 926 F. Supp. at 876; Solomon, 898 F. Supp. at 417; Haltek, 864 F.
Supp. at 807.
75
Stephen F. Befort, Demystifying Federal Labor and Employment Law
Preemption, 13 LAB. LAW. 429, 440–41 (1998).
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Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 285 (1987).
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For a table outlining the availability of punitive damages in state employment
discrimination statutes, see Stacy A. Hickox, Reduction of Punitive Damages for
Employment Discrimination: Are Courts Ignoring our Juries?, 54 MERCER L. REV.
1081, 1123–32 (2003).
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Sasaki v. Class, 92 F.3d 232, 235–36 (4th Cir. 1996).
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Id.
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Id. at 235.
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Id. at 237.

12

DAMAGE CAPS
cap awareness and thus why Congress had included the non-disclosure
provisions.82
The D.C. Circuit does not agree that Congress wanted to prohibit
award-shifting. In Martini v. Federal National Mortgage Association,83
plaintiff brought harassment and retaliation claims under both Title VII
and the D.C. Human Rights Act. The district court instructed the jury to
award damages not only based on the type of claim (i.e., harassment or
retaliation), but also based on the statute (federal or local law).84 The
jury awarded a total of nearly $7 million in damages, including $3
million in punitive damages under the Title VII claims and almost $2
million in compensatory and punitive damages on the D.C. Human
Rights claims.85 The district court then applied the $300,000 cap to the
Title VII damages. The D.C. Circuit, however, held that the district
court should have reallocated the excess Title VII damages to the
plaintiff's recovery under the D.C. Human Rights Act.86 Noting that the
district court had provided the same instructions for the federal and local
claims, the court held that the jury had no legal basis for distinguishing
between the statutes.87 Thus, for example, if the jury had awarded $2
million in punitive damages under the plaintiff’s Title VII retaliation
claim and $1 million in punitive damages under the D.C. Human Rights
retaliation claim, “the most sensible inference is that the jury sought to
impose a total of $3 million in punitive damages against [defendant] for
retaliation.”88 Thus, while only $300,000 of those damages could be
awarded under Title VII, the district court should have reallocated the
other $1.7 million to the local claim. The court stated: “Were we not to
treat damages under federal and local law as fungible where the
standards of liability are the same, we would effectively limit the local
jurisdiction's prerogative to provide greater remedies for employment
discrimination than those Congress has afforded under Title VII.”89
Most courts have held that district courts have discretion to
reallocate a total damages award between state and federal claims.90
82
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state law. Id. at 1350.
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Courts have been willing to shuffle the monetary awards between claims
in order to maximize the plaintiff’s recovery, particularly if the jury has
jointly allocated the damages to the state and federal claims. For
example, in Passatino v. Johnson & Johnson Consumer Products, Inc.,91
the plaintiff brought both Title VII claims and claims under the
Washington State Law Against Discrimination.92 The jury found for the
plaintiff, awarding her backpay as well as $1 million in compensatory
damages and $8.6 million in punitive damages. The district court
allocated all of the $1 million compensatory damages to the state claim,
and all of the punitive damages to federal claim.93 This allocation
maximized plaintiff’s recovery, as under state law compensatory
damages were uncapped, but punitive damages were not permitted.94
The Ninth Circuit upheld this allocation. The court noted: “An
allocation that would serve to reduce lawfully awarded damages would
fail to respect the jury’s verdict and conflict with the purpose and intent
of one or both statutes.”95
Courts thus appear to have two distinct viewpoints on the 1991
Civil Rights Act damage caps and their non-disclosure to the jury. One
perspective prizes the jurors’ ignorance of the caps as a way of insuring
that the jury does its work without an understanding of the ultimate
outcome. If jurors were told of the cap, this perspective fears, they
would engage in gamesmanship with any non-capped damages and
circumvent the purpose of the caps. The other perspective views the
caps as a procedural rule that plays only a limited role within the entire
process. Judges are permitted to reallocate jurors’ damage awards in an
effort to give the greatest possible recovery to the plaintiff. It seems
clear that under this perspective there would be little problem with
Kimzey v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 107 F.3d 568, 576 (8th Cir. 1997); Barrios v. Kody
Marine, Inc., 2000 WL 775067, at *4 (E.D. La. June 14, 2000); Luciano v. Olsten
Corp., 912 F. Supp., 663, 675 (E.D.N.Y. 1996), aff’d on other grounds, 110 F.3d 210
(2d Cir. 1997); Channon v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 629 N.W.2d 835, 851 (Iowa
2001). But see Oliver v. Cole Gift Centers, Inc., 85 F. Supp. 2d 109, 113 (D. Conn.
2000) (applying federal cap to total recovery under federal and state law, but also
noting that plaintiff was “adequately compensated” by the capped amount).
91
212 F.3d 493 (9th Cir. 2000).
92
Id. at 503.
93
Id. at 509–10.
94
Id.
95
Id. at 510. See also Barrios, 2000 WL 775067 at *4 (arguing that when the jury
fails to allocate awards between claims, “it is most consistent with the intent of the jury
to permit Plaintiff to recover the maximum amount possible”); Channon, 629 N.W.2d
at 851 (holding that limiting damages to the federal cap amount “effectively limits
[Iowa’s] prerogative to provide greater remedies under our civil rights statute than those
available under Title VII”).
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informing jurors about the caps, if doing so were permitted. Informing
the jurors would obviate the need for any post hoc reallocation, as the
jurors would be able to do this themselves. However, neither perspective
accounts for the possibility that knowledge of the caps will affect the
jurors’ calculations in ways other than simple reallocation. We
undertake an examination of these effects below.
II
EFFECTS OF CAPS ON JUROR DAMAGE DETERMINATIONS
From the sole comment in the legislative history about the
rationale for non-disclosure of the damage caps, it seems that the goal of
non-disclosure is to preserve the status quo—the integrity—of jury
deliberations.
Non-disclosure prevents pressure, “upward or
96
downward,” even while exerting control on the jury’s ability to impose
a verdict above the cap amount. So, while the cap clearly signals an
effort to lower federal employment discrimination verdicts, the nondisclosure provision has no such obvious directional purpose behind it.
By keeping juries ignorant of damage caps, legislators imply that
juries will be unable to compensate adequately for the effects of knowing
about the caps and will take the caps into account in making their
damages awards. In making this assumption, legislators appear to be
cognizant of the jurors as human decision-makers who may not always
follow a rational-actor model. Psychologists and others who study
decision-making have relied on both normative and descriptive models
to explain and envision the decision-making process; an examination of
decision-making models indicates that knowledge of the damage caps
may well influence juries.
Normative models of decision-making show how the fully
rational decision-maker would optimally make decisions based on a
certain set of rational assumptions. The classic normative analysis is
“expected utility theory”—that is, rational decision makers will seek to
maximize their expected utility.97 To do so, a rational decision maker
should calculate the utility of each choice available. The utility of each
possible outcome, given any one choice, is calculated and then weighted
by its probability. For example, if Choice A produces a 10% chance of
Outcome 1 and a 90% chance of Outcome 2, then choice A’s utility is
(utility of outcome 1 x .10) + (utility of outcome 2 x .90). Choice A’s
utility would then be compared to the utility of other potential choices.
96

137 Cong. Rec. S15484 (daily ed. Oct. 30, 1991) (Sen. Danforth).
SCOTT PLOUS, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING 80–83
(1993).
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The ultimate decision would be easily made in accordance with the
dominance principle, which suggests that a rational decision maker will
never choose an option that has less expected utilty than a different
option. Simply put, if one option, choice A, has more utility (e.g., is
better) than another option, choice B, a decision-maker will prefer and
thus select choice A over choice B.98
Another principle that is relevant in expected utility theory,
invariance, refers to the idea that varying descriptions of a choice should
not impact which choice is made.99 Whether one describes a choice in
terms of awarding money to a plaintiff or taking it from defendant, for
instance, should not impact the decision maker, if the monetary amounts
are in fact identical in both alternatives.
A jury composed of “rational actors” would use expected utility
theory to determine the optimal damages award for a plaintiff.
Knowledge of a damage cap would not influence such jurors’
assessments of appropriate damages, except to eliminate any choice
involving damages higher than the cap. Take, for instance, a jury that
does not know of a cap of $300,000 and rationally weighs damages
awards of $50,000, $80,000, and $110,000. Using a utility theory
approach, the jury might decide that $80,000 is the most appropriate
figure. With knowledge of the cap, this decision would not change,
because the caps do not change the utility or permissibility of the
available choices; rather, it merely limits the available choices to a range
that the jury already believes is appropriate.
Consider, however, a jury that is deliberating between $400,000,
$600,000 and $800,000. Under a normative approach to decisionmaking, the jury might arrive at $600,000. With knowledge of a
$300,000 cap, however, the jury will act rationally in awarding the
maximum damages figure of $300,000, because it will account for the
fact that its award would be higher but for the existence of the caps.100
Under a utility theory approach, knowledge of the caps will not change
juries’ assessments of damages awards, except that those awards that fall
above the cap range will all be considered as equal to the cap and each
other. Indeed, knowledge of the caps under this framework would only
act to maximize the efficiency of a rationally-acting jury: any debate or
discussion about varying awards over the cap would be unnecessary.

98

Id. at 81.
Id. at 82.
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The court in Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. EMC Corp. espoused
this notion of rationality. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. EMC Corp., 205
F.3d 1339 (Table), 2000 WL 191819, at *9 (6th Cir. Feb. 8, 2000).
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Presumably, then, since revealing the caps would make jury
deliberations faster and more efficient for a jury governed by expected
utility theory, Congress did not expect such a jury. And, in fact,
although normative principles have intuitive logical appeal, research has
consistently shown that human decision-makers deviate significantly
from normative decision-making principles. Descriptive decisionmaking models, heuristics, and decision-making phenomena account for
human patterns of behavior that normative theories do not explain.101 An
examination of these descriptive models, heuristics, and phenomena in
light of knowledge of the caps shows how such knowledge might affect
jury verdicts.
As explained below, anchoring is perhaps the most robust and
widely discussed psychological phenomenon that would come into play
in jury damage deliberations. It is not clear, however, that anchoring is
the sole potential effect that revealing the caps would produce. Below,
we consider anchoring as well as several other decision-making
paradigms that could potentially result in altering juries’ damages awards
in light of knowledge of the caps. An examination of these paradigms
suggests that knowledge of the caps could have both a quantitative
impact, affecting the ultimate numerical figure of the damage award,
either upward or downward, and a qualitative impact, making a
difference in how the jury arrives at its decision.
A. Anchoring and Adjustment
Psychological research has marshaled strong evidence for the
phenomena of anchoring and adjustment,102 in which the first number
with which a decision-maker is presented has a demonstrable effect on
that person’s ultimate choice. In essence, the first number heard
becomes the place away from which any adjustment is made. Anchoring
effects are powerful, widespread, and have been found in a variety of
contexts. The source of the anchoring first number need not even be tied
to any rational source; indeed, the groundbreaking initial research on
anchoring demonstrated that anchoring effects were robust even when
subjects believed the first number to be randomly generated.103 In one
101

Commentators have noted that there is a discrepancy between normative
decision-making theory and actual jury practice. See, e.g., Hal R. Arkes & Barbara A.
Mellers, Do Juries Meet Our Expectations? 26 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 625 (2002).
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We refer to the phenomenon of “anchoring and adjustment” simply as
anchoring throughout this section.
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example, researchers found that first asking whether the average
temperature in San Francisco was above or below 558 degrees
Fahrenheit resulted in higher estimates of the actual average temperature
than those given by people who had not been asked the first question.104
In situations where jurors learn of a damage cap, empirical
research has shown that there is a strong anchoring effect.105 Juries
make damage determinations by effectively moving “away from” the
stated cap to the degree they believe appropriate. Such anchoring effects
have been found in studies testing the impact of punitive damage caps on
mock jurors.106 As Michael Saks and his colleagues have found,
however, caps have differing effects on damage awards in low-severity,
medium-severity, and high-severity injury settings.107 In his juror
simulation study, individuals were presented with one of three
hypothetical injury scenarios and asked to make a damage award. Some
individuals were advised of the existence of a damage cap of $250,000
“to provide [them] some guidance” in making their determinations;
others were given no guidance or other forms of guidance, including
average awards or ranges of most awards. In the low-severity case
scenario, the cap produced higher awards than either no information or
other forms of guidance; in the medium-severity case, the cap produced a
similar outcome to the no information condition, but a higher outcome
than other forms of guidance yielded. Finally, in the high-severity case,
the cap produced a lower average damage award than the control. Thus
the cap acted to inflate damage awards for low-severity injuries, but to
deflate damage awards for high-severity injuries.108
In a different juror simulation study, Jennifer Robbennolt and
Christina Studebaker tested for anchoring effects by holding the severity
of the injury constant and instead altering the amount of the damage
cap.109 They found that knowledge of damage caps influences mock
jurors’ damages awards in both upward and downward directions,
depending on the size of the caps. For example, in one experiment, the
mean damage award made by individuals who were not given any
information about a cap was approximately $5 million; those who were
104
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told of a $100,000 cap awarded an average of $83,100, while those who
were told of a $50 million cap awarded an average of $9 million.110
Thus, high caps acted to inflate jury damage awards, while low caps
acted to deflate damage awards.111
Empirical research, then, reveals that damage caps do have the
potential to affect jury decision-making; however, it is not clear whether
anchoring effects around the § 1981a damage cap would act largely to
inflate or to depress damages awards. For example, consider a jury that,
if completely ignorant of the cap, might award $10,000,000 in damages
for what it thinks is particularly egregious conduct. If the jury learned of
the cap, and thus anchored at $300,000, they might award that maximum
or might adjust away to something less than $300,000, but their award
could not go beyond the cap. Thus, in the case of severe injury,
anchoring effects could only act to deflate the damage award. In
contrast, consider a jury that would have otherwise awarded $20,000 in
damages for minor injury. If that jury were made aware of the $300,000
cap, anchoring effects would likely pull the award higher than it would
have been without the cap.112
Anchoring effects of a damage cap cannot, of course, be
considered in a vacuum; empirical research has repeatedly shown that
the plaintiff’s demand for damages already acts as a psychological
anchor for jurors.113 Thus, the “pure” jury deliberations that the nondisclosure provision was designed to protect are already “tainted” by
what the plaintiff114 has asked for, if the plaintiff is permitted to ask for
damages in the jurisdiction.115 Especially in light of the fact that there
110
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are no restrictions on numbers plaintiffs’ attorneys propose, concern over
anchoring around the caps may be misguided. Indeed, forcing attorneys
to keep their demands in line with what caps permit would create far
more consistency in anchoring than already occurs within jury
deliberation because the anchoring would always be at the cap
number.116
Despite the empirical work on the effects of disclosed damage
caps on jury awards, it is difficult to predict what actual effects would
occur in the § 1981a context in the absence of empirical data regarding
the average size of a damage demand for federal employment
discrimination cases or the average size of damage awards. It is not even
clear what size employer is most often sued, meaning that the actual
monetary level of the cap that would be applied in most cases is not
certain. For these reasons, the most likely directionality of any
anchoring effects that disclosure of the caps might produce is not clear.
However, these effects appear more likely to raise awards on the lower
end of the scale and lower awards on the upper end of the scale.
B. Scaling
Empirical research has consistently demonstrated that the way in
which outcomes are described – that is, the framing of outcomes – does
have significant effects on individuals’ choices, in contrast to the
invariance principle of expected utility theory.117 Scaling is one type of
framing effect with the potential to impact jurors’ decision-making in
light of the disclosure of a damage cap. Scaling occurs when
individuals’ choices are affected by the presentation of "response scales,"
or ranges of possible response alternatives.118 Essentially, scaling means
that the presentation of a number or numbers creates a mental scale that
individuals use to calibrate choices. For example, psychologist Norbert
Schwarz and his colleagues asked individuals to estimate how much
television they watched per day.119 When individuals were given a scale
that went, at half-hour intervals, from a low end of one half hour to a
high end of more than two and a half hours, only sixteen percent of
monetary damage figure. GREENE & BORNSTEIN, supra note 113, at 151.
116
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respondents said that they watched more than two and a half hours of
television per day.120 But when individuals were given a scale that
ranged from “up to” two and a half hours at the low end to more than
four and a half hours at the high end, 37.5 percent of respondents said
that they watched more than two and a half hours per day.121 Those
using the lower value scale estimated the average citizen’s television
viewing time at 2.7 hours, while those using the higher value scale
estimated it at 3.2 hours.122
Theorists have suggested that this result stems from people’s
fundamental need to make conversational sense out of information that
has been provided to them.123 People assume that information is
provided because it is relevant to the task at hand, and is assumed to be
no more or less than is needed to complete the task.124 Take, for
instance, the case of television viewing: suppose one likes to think that
one watches an average (or better yet, slightly below average) amount of
television, but has not really bothered to count the actual time spent
watching. One will assume that the response scale provided by the
questioner reflects an accurate assessment of the range of television
viewing habits, from slight to heavy. Thus, a responder will choose a
point towards the lower end of the scale, regardless of what number is at
that lower point. As Schwarz shows, one would be less likely to choose
the highest number offered, because it seems so unlikely that the end
point of the scale would represent average or below average frequency.
Jurors presented with the damage cap may experience a scaling
effect, interpreting the maximum award amount as a measuring stick by
120
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which to assess conduct. Making “conversational” sense out of the cap
might mean that Congress has told the jury that this is the largest amount
of financial damage that one can sustain from a federal employment
discrimination violation—and, in turn, if this is the largest amount of
damage, then it must correspond to the most severe injury. That is, a
damage cap is a message from Congress (or the judge) to the jury that
says that the worst conduct is to be redressed by damages in the amount
of the cap. It logically follows that less egregious conduct should be
remedied by lower sums. For example, knowledge that the cap for
damages is $300,000 may prompt jurors to imagine that $100,000
appropriately compensates a lesser degree of injury, $200,000
compensates an intermediate degree of injury, and $300,000
compensates the highest degree of injury.
Without knowledge of the caps, juries may use plaintiffs’
requests for damages as the marker of a response scale: for instance, if
plaintiff alleges egregious conduct and asks for $10,000,000, a jury may
decide that the conduct is only moderately severe, and award
$5,000,000; that same jury faced with a plaintiff asking for $1,000,000
might award $500,000. On the other hand, jurors might disregard
plaintiffs’ requests as self-interested and create their own scales for
damages using other criteria.
There is still an open question, as with anchoring, as to the most
likely directionality of any scaling effects on verdicts. Take a case
where the jury believes that the injury is intermediate: if their award
without disclosure of the caps would have been $50,000, then scaling
effects from the disclosure of the caps might raise their award to
$200,000. But if the jury would have awarded $1,000,000 for an
intermediate injury, then scaling would act to lower it, even more than
the mere cap at $300,000 would do. The findings of Saks and his
colleagues are, in fact, largely consistent with scaling effects, and
suggest that scaling effects could increase the damage awards for lower
injury cases.125 However, further empirical research is needed to assess
how scaling effects might function.
C. Prospect Theory and Loss Aversion
Prospect theory posits that people do not assess utility per se
when making a decision; rather, they evaluate their options based on the
resulting gain or loss from a starting reference point.126 Prospect theory
125
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was expressly developed to explain research findings that showed that
individuals consistently make decisions that do not conform to principles
of expected utility theory.127 Prospect theory relies heavily on the
concept that individuals are deeply affected by how decisions are
framed. Losses “loom” larger than gains, and decision-makers will take
greater risk to avoid a loss than they would to reap a similar gain—that
is, they are loss averse.128
Without knowledge of a damage cap, a jury is likely to perceive
any amount that it awards the plaintiff as a gain for the plaintiff.129 But
in light of the existence of a damage cap, jurors may perceive any award
that is less than the cap as a loss, and would be more averse to awarding
a number below the cap than they would have otherwise been if ignorant
of the cap. Any loss-aversion effects due to knowledge of the damage
caps, then, would exert upward pressure on damage awards.
A related psychological phenomenon, the “endowment effect,”130
similarly suggests that knowledge of the caps will produce higher awards
than ignorance of the caps. Under the endowment effect, people value
the things that they already possess more highly than they would value
those same things if they had to acquire them ab initio.131 Jurors
learning of the cap may perceive it as consonant with a damages award
itself. Mentally perceiving the damage limit as a damage award that has
already been awarded to the plaintiff could result in framing effects that
code any award under the cap as a loss. If such jurors identify with the
plaintiff and perceive a lesser award as “giving up” money, they may act
to prevent this from happening.
The status quo bias, another psychological phenomenon based
largely on the principle of loss aversion, may similarly exert upward
pressure on the average damage award. The status quo bias is a
phenomenon whereby people remain at the status quo because
disadvantages of leaving it loom larger than advantages.132 For this
reason, jurors may latch on to the cap amount as the status quo and be
FRAMES 17, 18 (Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky eds., 2000).
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reluctant to award any lower amount.
Both the endowment effect and the status quo bias seem more
likely to occur with a damage cap than with a plaintiff’s request for
damages, because jurors are likely to perceive the damages request as an
aspiration by plaintiff, in contrast to an endowment or pronouncement by
the legislature or court. Theoretically, loss aversion effects are likely to
increase damage awards in low or moderate-severity cases, where juries
would otherwise have awarded damages in an amount below the cap, but
would not have any impact on damage awards for very severe cases, in
which juries would likely have awarded damages above the cap. This is
largely consistent with the empirical findings of Saks and his colleagues,
who found that low-severity cases received higher damages when jurors
knew of a cap.133
D. Evasion and Reactance
Knowledge of the existence of caps might simply cause jurors,
acting rationally, to reapportion their damages award among the
plaintiff’s different claims. For example, assume that jurors arrive at a
damages figure that they believe appropriately responds to the particular
needs of the plaintiff and the behavior of the defendant. Knowledge of a
cap that is less than that figure may prompt jurors to be creative in
allocating damages to various claims, in essence evading the cap in order
to provide the plaintiff with what they believe is the proper amount of
damages.
The court in Sasaki believed just such evasion had taken place
when the jury awarded $61,250 in damages under the Title VII claim and
$150,000 in damages under the state tort claim. Had the jury not known
about the cap, it might have allocated all of its damages to the sexual
harassment claim, or at least might have divided the damages 50/50
between the claims. Knowledge of the cap allowed the jury to provide a
larger overall damages award for the plaintiff’s federal and state claims.
Thus, disclosure of the caps may make a rationally acting jury divide its
award in a different manner than it otherwise might have done; however,
the total damage award would not differ from what would have been
awarded had there been no caps at all. If juries were able to evade the
Congressional caps, average total damage awards would be presumably
be higher.
Might the jurors act not just to evade the restrictions of the caps,
but in a way that specifically expresses a reaction to being restricted in
133
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their decision-making? The psychological theory of reactance posits that
when individuals feel that their behavior options have been limited, they
react by becoming psychologically aroused.134 Possible effects of this
stimulus include increased attraction to the forbidden option. Under this
theory, juries might not merely reallocate damages into another category
in order to evade the restriction on their behavior; the restriction might
even propel them to find a high monetary award more appealing than
they would have without knowledge of a cap.135 Reactance effects
would, then, exert upward pressure on overall damages awards.
In a process similar to reactance, jurors might experience reactive
devaluation based on revelation of the caps by the judge or attorneys.
Reactive devaluation describes the phenomenon in which individuals
assess the appeal of a choice based on the identity of the entity proposing
the choice. If an individual perceives a choice as stemming from an
adversary, the choice is less appealing than the same choice would be
coming from an ally.136 For example, in the 1980’s, students who heard
the same proposal about nuclear disarmament rated it more favorably
when the source was said to be the United States than when the source
was said to be the Soviet Union.137
In the case of caps, if the jury perceives the court and/or
Congress as limiting its power—and thus as an opposing party to it—the
jury may reactively devalue a damage cap so that it no longer seems
adequate to compensate a plaintiff fully for the harm suffered. That is,
the jury may perceive that if the court and/or Congress believes that a
cap figure is sufficient to compensate the plaintiff, then it certainly
cannot be adequate to compensate the plaintiff. Similar to the process of
reactance, the jury may then not only award the maximum that the cap
permits, but may be spurred on to award more money for any other
available claim. In absence of disclosure of the caps, jurors are unlikely
to feel themselves in opposition to the plaintiff once they have decided
on the defendant’s liability, making it far less likely that the figure
proposed by a plaintiff will produce reactive devaluation.
134
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There is currently no empirical data that supports a reactance or
reactive devaluation effect in jury damage awards. A study by Greene et
al. found that compensatory damage awards made by mock jurors who
were told of a cap on punitive damages but were able to award uncapped
compensatory damages did not differ significantly from compensatory
damage awards made by mock jurors who were able to award unlimited
punitive and compensatory damages.138 An earlier study by Jennifer
Robbennolt and Christina Studebaker yielded similar results.139
However, the Greene study did note that jurors inflated their
compensatory awards when they were not allowed to give any punitive
damages at all.140
Although research findings do not support a finding of reactance
or reactive devaluation by juries in response to damage caps, it is not
clear that jurors would never have such a reaction to any legislative cap
in any legal context. Several important differences between the studies
that have been performed to date and the § 1981a context include, for
example, the § 1981a limit on both punitive and compensatory damages,
so that in essence the caps limit all non-equitable141 recovery under
federal civil rights law. Additionally, there has not yet been a study that
has tested for reactance or reactive devaluation effects in a group “jury”
setting rather than among individual mock jurors.142 Without such
research, we cannot yet say what the likely potential behavioral
responses to the caps would be.
E. Availability
Informing juries of a cap on damages may also produce an
availability effect. The damage cap amount will be more salient, or
available to the jury, than any other potential damage award.
Availability is a decision-making heuristic in which decision-makers
138
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assess the likelihood of an event by how easily a similar event can be
brought to mind.143 For example, research has shown that individuals
believe it is more likely that one would be killed by a shark attack than
by falling airplane parts.144 Certainly, people have heard more about
shark attacks than they have about deaths due to falling airplane parts. In
truth, however, the odds of death from a shark attack are far lower than
the odds of death from falling airplane parts.145 Theorists have explained
this result by noting that examples of shark attacks are far more mentally
available to the average person than examples of people being hit by
falling pieces of an airplane.146
In making their determination of damages, jurors could more
easily bring the cap amount to mind than other amounts of damage
awards. Of course, if the jury would have found damages in an amount
over the cap without knowledge of the cap, then availability will not
affect the ultimate outcome. But if a jury would have awarded fewer
damages, the availability of the cap number may prompt jurors to arrive
at a higher damages figure. In essence, availability suggests that jurors,
trying to think up a damages award, will be asking themselves, “What
does a damage award look like?” and will answer, “It looks like [the
figure provided by the court as a cap].” Any availability effect of the cap
may also depend on what other damage award numbers are present in
jurors’ minds. For example, jurors may know of damage awards in other
cases,147 or may be aware of both the plaintiff’s and defendant’s
suggestions of appropriate damage awards.
F. Satisficing
Knowledge of damage caps may affect not just the bottom line
but also the “quality” of the jury’s damage decision. Although empirical
work has indicated that juries do not make decisions according to
expected utility theory, the justice system is premised on an assumption
that juries do make an effort to reach good decisions. However,
knowledge of a cap may encourage the use of certain heuristics, or
“shortcuts” to decision-making, that psychologists and other researchers
have identified as being used by individual decision-makers in realworld decision-making.
For instance, the satisficing heuristic describes a decision-making
143
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process in which a decision-maker sets a minimum value that attributes
of any alternative must meet.148
The decision-maker considers
alternatives one by one, in whatever order they happen to be presented.
The first alternative in which each attribute meets the decision-maker’s
minimum is selected. Regardless of how many additional alternatives
remain to be examined, the decision-maker then stops and does not
examine any other alternatives.149
In juror deliberations, a damage cap could encourage a jury to
choose a satisficing heuristic. The range of damage awards is far
narrower with a cap; jurors might perceive the cap as the criteria that
their award must meet. Thus, as soon as one juror proposed a damages
award that fell under the cap, jurors would accept that number without
considering other alternatives. For example, a juror might propose
$250,000 in damages; in light of the cap, other jurors would agree to the
proposal to save time and effort, even though, without knowledge of a
cap, jurors might have weighed a number of options and arrived at a
different decision. However, there has not been any empirical research
to date that examines whether juries may use a satisficing process in their
deliberations.
G. Overall Effects of Disclosure Versus Non-Disclosure
Psychological research, then, makes clear that the juries’
decision-making processes, as well as ultimate awards, will likely differ
if juries are informed of the damage caps. Both theoretical work and
empirical research seem to indicate that disclosure of the caps would
tend to raise average awards in low-severity injury cases, but would tend
to lower average awards in high-severity injury cases. However, given
the complexities involved in assessing severity levels in individual,
unique cases,150 it is still largely unclear whether the disclosure of the
caps would pressure the bulk of awards upward or downward.
Nonetheless, it is clear that non-disclosure does act as a buffer,
preventing the caps from affecting the jury’s damage award decision148
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making process. Thus, the caps do act to protect the integrity of this
process.151 Below, however, we explore a graver consequence of nondisclosure—a threat to the integrity of the jury system as a whole.
III
THE EFFECTS OF NON-DISCLOSURE ON THE JURY SYSTEM
To date, what little systematic attention that has been paid to the
non-disclosure of damage caps has focused on the potential effects that
disclosure versus non-disclosure might have on jury damages
deliberations and calculations. Above, we offer a more comprehensive
examination of these effects, suggesting ways in which several
psychological principles might exert upward or downward pressure on
the jurors’ ultimate verdicts as well as alter the quality of the decisionmaking process itself. There has, however, been no attention given to
the (more pernicious) potential effects of non-disclosure of the caps on
the judicial process itself. Non-disclosure has the potential to trigger a
loss of confidence and trust in the jury system, as well as cause
inefficiencies in the system stemming from effects on attorney and juror
behavior. We discuss these effects below.
A. The Threat to the Jury as a Procedurally Just System
The jury plays a crucial political role in the United States. It has
been argued that average citizens follow the law not because of the threat
of punishment but because the law is perceived as legitimate.152 Juries
are an important element of the legitimacy of the legal system.153
Theorists have also identified another important function of the jury: the
socializing function in which the jury both allows regular citizens to
participate in the legal process and educates citizens about that
process.154 Thus, juries play a political role both on a macro and a
micro-level, serving as a crucial element of a legitimate democratic
government and engaging average citizens in the political system.
Psychological research has identified the principle of procedural
justice as an important element of individuals’ perceptions and opinions
of legal systems and structures. In the 1970s, a growing dissatisfaction
with the American legal system helped to spawn research into procedural
151
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justice.155 Thibaut and Walker suggested that a focus on procedural
justice—in essence, on the fairness of process—might offer a solution to
problems such as widespread non-compliance with court orders,
especially in the child custody domain.156 The fundamental premise of
procedural justice literature is that individuals are not solely motivated
by the objective quality or the subjective fairness of the outcome.
Rather, the procedural justice literature suggests that the justice process
itself is vital to individuals’ experiences—people are more satisfied with
outcomes, view them as more favorable, and are more willing to comply
voluntarily with third-party decisions, when they perceive the process by
which the outcomes were achieved as fair.157
Procedural justice effects have been found in a variety of legal
contexts, including with juries,158 police,159 mediators,160 and other
government authorities.161 Theorists have suggested that assessments of
procedural justice are vital to the acceptance of decisions by legal
authorities and, indeed, to the continued preservation of society.162
Procedural justice plays a powerful role in shaping trust in, and
perceptions of legitimacy of, authorities. People comply with the law,
trust the law, and respect the law due in large measure to their
perceptions that the law is a system of fair procedures. Trust and
reliance in the jury system are important to the continued respect for the
justice system as a whole, and trust and reliance can be affected by the
perception that the jury system is a fair one.163 Concealing damage caps
from the jury has the potential to suggest a procedurally unfair system:
players as diverse as the plaintiff, defendant, attorneys, jurors, and the
public at large may experience procedural justice effects from a rule that
prevents jurors from learning of damage caps.
1. Effects on Parties to the Dispute
155
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People take their disputes to the legal system not just to win, but
to resolve their case through a fair process. How might the concealment
of a damage cap164 affect parties’ perceptions that the legal process is
fair? Procedural justice literature suggests that the process by which a
dispute is resolved has a distinct impact on the parties’ satisfaction with
the resolution, over and above the distributive—that is, typically, the
monetary—outcome. As we have discussed in Part II supra, disclosure
of the cap would likely have some impact on the monetary award made
by the jury, but it is not clear whether the award would systematically
rise or fall due to disclosure—meaning that it is not clear whether
plaintiffs or defendants would typically benefit from disclosure of the
cap. But procedural justice literature suggests that all parties, even the
“winners,” are less satisfied with the outcome when it is arrived at
through an unfair process.165 Thus, a fair process is a powerful factor in
determining satisfaction. For this reason, both plaintiffs and defendants
may be less satisfied with the jury verdict.
Although both parties may assess the process less favorably if it
is not procedurally fair, the paradigmatic case in which a procedural
justice effect is most likely is the case in which a jury awards the
plaintiff damages higher than the cap amount. Consider, for example, a
case such as Passatino v. Johnson & Johnson Consumer Products in
which an $8,600,000 punitive damages award was reduced to $300,000
pursuant to the § 1981a damage caps.166 From a psychological
perspective, a number of the heuristics and biases that we discussed in
Part II, supra, come into play in how plaintiffs would assess this
monetary result. First, because plaintiffs hear the larger verdict first
(even if they already know, as is likely, of the existence of the caps),
they may frame the lower award as a loss of the difference, rather than as
a gain of the cap amount. This means that the cap “takes away” money
that the jury has awarded them and to which they may feel entitled.
Similarly, the jury’s verdict acts as an anchor when plaintiffs assess what
their case is “worth”: plaintiffs can contrast the cap amount with the
damages award and are more likely to arrive at an unfavorable
conclusion about the distributive fairness of their outcome.
But aside from the perception that the actual damages award is
unfair, plaintiffs are also likely to be more upset and angry with the legal
164
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process when a jury awards them one amount and the judge must enforce
a law that caps that amount. Procedurally, this is a very different
experience than the one that plaintiffs would experience if judges
informed jurors up front that there was a cap on recovery. In that case,
juries would never make such an inflated award in the first place, and
plaintiffs would not experience any sense of either distributive or
procedural unfairness stemming from the jury’s actions in light of the
cap. Any sense of procedural (or distributive) unfairness would have to
stem from Congress’s actions in capping the damages, rather than
from—as in the case of concealment—the legal system that permitted a
“true” assessment of their damages but only gave them some, possibly
small,167 percentage of that award.
2. Effects on Attorneys
Lawyers, too, may arrive at the conclusion that the system is not
procedurally fair—and lawyers’ continued respect for legal authorities
and institutions is an important component of the functioning of the legal
system as a whole. In particular, courts have interpreted Title VII’s nondisclosure requirement to prevent attorneys as well as the court itself
from informing juries of the caps. In jurisdictions that permit attorneys
to request specific amounts of damages, this has the potential to force
attorneys to engage in a “courthouse charade” in which they must
explicitly pretend that the caps do not exist.
Although § 1981a(c)(2) simply requires that “the court shall not
inform the jury of the limitations” imposed by the caps, in both Sasaki
and EMC plaintiff’s counsel, not the court, was accused of violating the
non-disclosure provision. Moreover, counsel did not even specifically
mention the caps; instead, they said that jurors could award “up to
$50,000” 168 or “a maximum of $300,000.”169 But the courts held that
the reference to a limit on damages was a violation of the non-disclosure
cap.
The reasonable import of these cases, then, is that plaintiff’s
counsel cannot mention any limit on damages. But could, or should,
counsel limit its request to the amount of the caps? What if plaintiff’s
167
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counsel in Sasaki had instead told the jury, “We are asking you to award
$50,000 on the harassment claim and $150,000 on the tort claim”? Such
a pitch has no reference to any limits imposed on damages. Jurors might
wonder why the plaintiff had structured her request that way, but they
would not have been “inform[ed]” of the cap. Although not ruling on
this issue, the Fourth Circuit noted that “[s]pecifically requesting the cap
amount without explicitly mentioning the cap would violate the spirit (if
not the letter) of the law.”170
If counsel cannot even tailor their damage requests to comply
with the law, then § 1981a(c)(2) goes beyond merely placing a restriction
on what courts and counsel may say. Instead, the law has effectively coopted counsel into affirmatively perpetuating the charade that the caps do
not exist. In interpreting the cap non-disclosure clause, the courts seem
to be calling on counsel to perform a kabuki-style theater, where
plaintiffs’ attorneys ask for some amount of damages in excess of the
caps while knowing they can get no more than the cap. This puts
plaintiffs’ attorneys in a quandary as they approach the task of
determining their damage demand.
Moreover, at least according to the D.C. Circuit, a jury is entitled
to allocate disproportionate damages to a state or local law claim, and
thus “evade” the cap, if the state or local law claim has no restriction on
damages.171 In fact, in Martini the court presumed that the jury intended
to do this, even though the jury had instead allocated the damages
roughly equally between the two claims.172 A plaintiff’s attorney may
conceivably want to discuss this possibility with the jury, in order to
explain how the jury must structure its award to achieve the desired
result. However, since such an explanation would at least imply the
existence of a cap, under Sasaki and EMC it would be impermissible.
Without information about the caps, jurors would not be in a position to
express their preferences about damages in light of the damages
restrictions. Thus, as in Martini, the court would be left to reconstruct
juror preferences after the fact.
In essence, attorneys are co-opted by statute and case law into
misleading the jury by suggesting damage amounts that are far in excess
of what the judgment could ultimately be.173 This means that lawyers
170
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are required to engage in deception, which increases their perception that
they are engaged in an untrustworthy system; this seems likely to lower
lawyers’ respect for the integrity of the legal process. Additionally,
plaintiffs’ attorneys may suffer the same effects that plaintiffs
themselves experience, in that a procedure that allows for the jury to
pronounce some “value” of a case but only permits recovery of some
fraction thereof may seem patently unfair, in a way that would not occur
if juries knew of the cap at the outset.174 And, of course, attorneys
whose fees are contingency-based may perceive themselves as suffering
financial loss when they compare their fee under the jury’s original
determination with their fee under a cap system.
3. Effects on Jurors
Jurors’ perceptions of the fairness of the jury system, too, may
suffer from non-disclosure of the cap. Imagine yourself as a juror
considering a Title VII claim. After hearing testimony about extensive,
pervasive, and egregious discrimination by a Fortune 500 company, you
have determined that the defendant is liable for intentional
discrimination. The discrimination reached the highest levels of the
company, and management showed no interest in redressing or
preventing discrimination in the future. After determining that the
company intentionally violated federal law,175 you and the other jurors
carefully evaluate the evidence to determine the proper level of damages.
Based on the pain and suffering caused to the plaintiff, the jury awards
$500,000 in compensatory damages, and levels a $1 million punitive
award based on the company’s systemic misconduct. However, after
spending hours to arrive at this damages assessment, you learn that the
court will reduce the $1.5 million award to $300,000 and that, in fact, it
would have been impossible for the plaintiff to receive more than
$300,000.
While caps themselves may frustrate a jury that feels that the
injury with which it is confronted merits a greater payout, we posit that it
is much more damaging to the jurors’ confidence in the jury system to
hide the existence of those caps. While little attention has been paid to
this concern, we believe it is a significant side effect of a non-disclosure
system. It may be that jurors would never learn about the imposition of
the amount that they “might have been able to get” were it not for the damage cap itself.
174
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the cap; however, even if they do not learn about it in the courtroom,
they could still find out in the courthouse or in the press.176 If jurors
become aware of the damage cap’s effect on their verdict, their belief in
the procedural justice of the jury system may be eroded.
Jurors involved in the process may reach the conclusion that the
process that they have participated in is not procedurally fair with respect
to their contribution. Jury duty is a rare moment in which ordinary
citizens are bound up with the legal system; research has shown that the
experience of jury duty typically boosts jurors’ positive attitude toward
jury service and their confidence in the jury system.177 Concealment of
the cap has the potential to add a component to jury service that would
worsen jurors’ attitudes toward jury service and decrease their
confidence in the system.
Although the number of citizens who serve as jurors at any one
time is a small percentage of the whole population, in the aggregate a
substantial portion of the population will at some point serve on a jury.178
Additionally, jurors communicate their experience on a jury to others so
that their experiences, negative or positive, have the potential to create a
ripple effect in the community.179 While it is true that an even smaller
percentage of those who actually do serve on a jury will serve on a jury
that hears a Title VII or other federal employment discrimination case,
there are nonetheless a class of citizens who will have direct experience
with the concealed damage cap.180
Concealing the damage cap could affect involved jurors’
assessment of procedural justice in other ways as well. Researchers have
suggested that voice is an important antecedent of procedural justice
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assessments.181 When individuals feel that they have had the opportunity
to express themselves and to be heard, they are more likely to feel that
the process is a fair one.182 One could conceive of a damages award as
an expression by the jury of its views with respect to a defendant’s
behavior. If the cap thwarts the jury in expressing itself through its
damage award, jury members may conclude that the process is not a fair
one.183 The jury members are likely to feel that their voices have not
been heard or respected, in a way that is unlikely if they know before
their deliberations that a cap limits the amount of damages that they may
award.
Research has also suggested that the degree of control that
individuals have in any given decision-making process plays an
important role in whether they feel that the process is fair.184 In the
context of the jury, it is not the concealment of the cap that affects the
jurors’ ultimate control over the damages award, but the cap itself.
Nonetheless, concealing the cap changes the jury’s expectations of its
own role, so that while a jury aware of the cap might feel that it had full
control over the damages award within the confines of the cap, a jury
that did not know of the cap would feel that it had no control if it
awarded damages in an amount that was summarily rejected due to the
imposition of the cap.
4.

Systemic Effects

Regardless of the individual experiences of people directly
involved in a particular case, the structural design of a system in which
jurors are purposely misled and their views are discarded may have
important procedural justice effects as well. Particularly since Title VII
deals with race and sex discrimination, plaintiffs, jurors, and society at
large could not be blamed for feeling that the system is “fixed” against
women and minorities after the cap swoops in from out of nowhere to
rescue defendants. In light of public perceptions that the justice system
is systematically biased against racial and ethnic minorities,185 the cap
non-disclosure clause is only likely to make a bad situation worse.
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Above and beyond the cap’s limiting of monetary recovery for the
victims of race or sex discrimination, the non-disclosure provision
suggests that the government wants ordinary citizens to be kept in the
dark about this limitation. Not only are damage caps a protection for
employers, but they are meant to be a secret from most of the public.
More broadly, an understanding on the part of the general public
that jury damage awards are being made in a vacuum of information
about caps could suggest not only that the decision-making process in
Title VII cases is unfair, but that the government does not trust ordinary
citizens with important information. This directly undermines the
legitimacy of the jury system and citizens’ trust in authority.
B. The Potential for Flawed Decision-making
Proponents of cap non-disclosure argue that knowledge of the
caps would taint juror calculations about the damages.186 However, juror
ignorance about the cap also has the potential to distort the jurors’ true
intentions for appropriate relief. In cases involving both state and federal
employment claims, different legal regimes may govern the available
awards that juries may choose. If courts are interested in determining
what jurors feel is appropriate in light of these different regimes, it
would be easiest simply to explain the different systems and have the
jurors arrive at the appropriate award. Disclosure would alleviate the
need for courts such as Martini187 to reallocate damages in an effort to
achieve the jury’s intended award. Instead, juries could work within the
permitted framework to allocate damages according to their conception
of justice.188
Courts such as the Fourth Circuit in Sasaki189 might object to
giving the jurors the opportunity to game the system by, for example,
overallocating damages to the uncapped state law claim. However, what
does the concept of “overallocation” mean in this context? The § 1981a
186
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damage caps do not preempt the ability of states to allow much greater
damages for the same underlying injury.190 If jurors unsuspectingly
allocate damages to the capped federal claim rather than the uncapped
state or local claim, they have essentially been tricked into letting the
federal cap dictate the scope of relief. Hiding the effect of the caps, and
then failing to reallocate damages to the uncapped claims, is
disrespectful not only of the jury’s decision but also state law.191 The
best solution is simply to inform the jury about the relevant damages
limitations and then let the jurors allocate between claims as they deem
proper.192
C. Inefficiencies of Non-Disclosure
Requiring jurors to be ignorant of the caps imposes inefficiencies
on the jurors’ process for calculating damages. If jurors who are
unaware of the cap know that they wish to award damages greater than
the cap, but are unsure about what size their award should be, they may
waste considerable time on an essentially moot decision. For example,
suppose that jurors have found the defendant liable in a Title VII
harassment case but are uncertain whether to award $500,000 or $1
million in punitive damages. Jurors may waste considerable time and
effort in making this decision, but the outcome will be an award of
$300,000 regardless.
A traditional complaint about jury service is that it has the
potential to waste citizens’ time: jury service takes people away from
their work and other responsibilities and can consist of long periods of
time spent waiting to be empanelled or questioned by attorneys.193 The
additional time spent by jurors working out a damages award that, in any
event, will be struck down to the level of the cap can only exacerbate
jurors’ perception that the judicial system wastes their time. This
inefficiency has the potential effect of frustrating the jury system’s
overall efficiency by providing additional incentives for citizens to evade
jury service.
190
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Another potential ill effect of required non-disclosure is that it
promotes—indeed, mandates—citizen ignorance about the law. This
contrasts with the general societal prerequisite that citizens be fully
aware of and follow the law.194 Although most jurors are most likely
unaware of the damage caps, should the court exclude jurors who do
know about the caps from Title VII juries? It would seem to follow from
Sasaki that jurors should not be informed of the caps, even by other
members of the jury.195 This poses a bit of a paradox: how could the
court or attorneys discover which jurors had such knowledge and should
be excluded without themselves revealing in some way that such caps
exist? Certainly, any process by which potential jurors are quizzed about
their knowledge of the law adds inefficiency to the jury system. And, if
knowledgeable jurors are thus excluded, the pool of potential Title VII
jurors becomes tilted towards those jurors who are less informed about
the law generally.
In a related vein, jurors who have some knowledge of the law
may be incorrect in their understandings: for example, a jury member
might believe that the cap is much lower or higher than it really is, and
reveal that misinformation to the rest of the jury.196 This misinformation
could affect and skew the jury’s decision-making far more than an
explanation by the judge of the relevant cap, providing further departure
from the proper measure of damages. For this reason, too, preventing
the court from informing juries about the caps is problematic. In the
absence of revealing the caps, there is no consistency among juries with
respect to the information they possess about damage awards.
We do not suggest here that it is never appropriate to prevent
some individuals from serving, or to conceal some information from the
jury. It is undoubtedly true that juries should be as unbiased as possible,
and jurors are therefore excluded from service for all manner of valid
reasons.197 Similarly, a court keeps a host of possible data from the jury:
past criminal records and unduly prejudicial material, for example. In
any of these cases, one might raise the concern that keeping the jurors in
ignorance has a detrimental effect on procedural justice assessments.
However, in each case, concerns about procedural justice must be
weighed against the countervailing justice concerns that would be raised
by allowing jurors access to the information. For example, allowing
194
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jurors to see particularly grisly photos of a crime scene may taint the
fairness of the trial a defendant receives; the fairness concerns in
preventing the jury from seeing the photos outweighs the fairness
concerns of jurors’ access to information. Indeed, jurors themselves
might even agree, ex post, that this information could have prevented
them from making a fair and accurate, unbiased determination of the
facts. Additionally, most of the other information that is kept from juries
is done so in a fact-finding context. Here, jurors are asked not to
determine the facts but to arrive at a damages award—there is no “truth”
to discover, but rather, a decision to be made by the jury about the worth
of the case. There is no compelling countervailing reason for this
enforced ignorance that outweighs its negative procedural justice effects.
IV
CAP DISCLOSURE AND THE DEBATE ABOUT JUROR DISCRETION
The disclosure or non-disclosure of damage caps is but one star
in the constellation of controversy over juror discretion in awarding
damages. The propensity for juries to award staggering sums in punitive
or compensatory damages has spawned an entire political movement
under the banner of “tort reform.”198 As jurors level punitive damages
that reach into the billions,199 legislatures and courts have begun
developing methods to cabin larger verdicts. Damage caps are one
straightforward way for legislatures to rein in jury awards. And the
Supreme Court has undertaken scrutiny of punitive damages under the
Due Process clause.200 Both of these developments—the massive awards
and the efforts to review or restrain them—have generated heated
political controversy and a wealth of academic analysis and debate.201
198
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We do not seek to enter into this maelstrom in our limited
discussion here. However, our perspective on cap disclosure does
dovetail nicely with a growing consensus in the realm of damages
assessment: namely, the benefits of providing more information and
direction to juries in making their damages assessments.
As courts, practitioners, and academics have noted, jurors
generally get precious little instruction on how to calculate compensatory
and punitive damages.202 Instructions on compensatory damages may
simply be a recitation of the different categories of such damages: pain
and suffering, inconvenience, emotional stress, impairment of quality of
life, mental anguish, and other “nonpecuniary” losses.203 And punitive
damages instructions may simply recite the applicable standard for
awarding them (e.g., “willful and wanton conduct”), and then note that
the purpose of punitive damages is to punish.204 Even if an instruction
also counsels the jury to avoid “passion or prejudice,” such an instruction
on its own does little to provide structure to the jury’s contemplation. 205
Commentators fear that the unguided discretion provided to juries allows
jurors’ biases and judgmental deficiencies to take over the damages
deliberation process.206
There is voluminous debate about the extent to which jury
damage awards have gone “out of control.”207 However, there is greater
consensus that compensatory and punitive damages are unpredictable
and variable—namely, that similar injuries do not receive the same
compensation.208 Studies into this phenomenon have noted the difficulty
202
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in translating underlying judgments about compensation and punishment
into actual dollar awards. In a study of juror decision-making, Sunstein,
Kahneman and Schkade surveyed jury-eligible citizens about potential
damages in a personal injury case.209 They found that there was strong
agreement across demographic groups about the level of outrage and
punishment to be directed at different factual scenarios.210 However,
they also discovered that the jurors had great difficulty mapping these
shared value judgments onto an unbounded scale of dollars.211 As a
result, they found “severe unpredictability and highly erratic outcomes”
when it came to the dollar awards determined by participants.212 The
study showed that participants were susceptible to influence by available
anchors, any comparison cases that had been provided, or the limited
context that had been provided in some cases.213 Jurors were searching
for some kind of framing device and thus relied too heavily on whatever
context that the materials provided.214
Commentators have begun to coalesce around the notion that
jurors need more context and structure to their deliberations about
compensatory and punitive awards.215 Juries need more information, the
thinking goes, in order to place their awards within a predictable and fair
societal range. A variety of processes could be implemented in order to
provide more context. More specific jury instructions could provide
juries with more concrete factors or examples to assess when making
their determination.216 Caps could also provide context: the cap tells
jurors that the legislature believes damages should rise no further than
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the amount of the cap. A more refined system of context would be a
framework of damage scaling or scheduling: the jury would be given a
series of characteristics about the case to evaluate, or a set of examples
of other cases to compare to their own.217 The jurors would thus be
asked to place their assessments within a framework of societallyacceptable damage awards. These frameworks could be constructed
along the lines of the federal sentencing guidelines: jurors would find
certain facts about the case and then correlate those facts to the
guidelines to determine the damages.218 Providing more context to the
jury’s findings about pain, outrage, and punishment would enable jurors
to do their jobs more knowledgably and consistently.
Disclosure of the damage caps could thus be part of an overall
contextual framework for jurors in making compensatory and punitive
awards. Taking the caps themselves as a given, disclosure of the caps
would provide jurors with a context for their decisions. Ideally,
Congress would give the caps themselves further context for the jurors to
contemplate. For example, did Congress intend the caps as the
maximum that it believed any jury should award?219 If so, judges could
instruct jurors that the purpose of these caps is to establish the maximum
amount of damages that a jury can award; thus, these damages represent
the most extreme end of the spectrum. In this way, the court would
acknowledge the effect of response scales on the jury and selfconsciously attempt to create such a scale for the jury to utilize. If this
scale were combined with instructions detailing the factors that should
go into determinations for compensatory and punitive damages, jurors
could be far more reasoned and systematic in their damage awards.220
It is perhaps more likely, however, that Congress did not intend
$300,000 as the maximum amount of damages that should reasonably be
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awarded in all cases.221 Instead, Congress might have recognized that a
perfectly rational jury should, in some cases, award more than the cap,
but might have feared that actual juries would do so far more often than
would be proper.222 Thus, the cap would be based on Congress’s
determination that juror bias in inflating damages required a cap that cut
off some higher awards that would be justified. Alternatively, Congress
might have created the caps not out of fear of juror inflation, but instead
as part of a political compromise. Under this reading of the statute, the
caps do not reflect an attempt by Congress to counteract juror bias, but
instead reflect a number that was acceptable to members of Congress.223
Under either of these scenarios, a scale for which $300,000 was the
“maximum” would not reflect Congressional intent. Instead, courts
should inform the jurors of the cap, but also inform jurors of the purpose
behind the cap.224
If the cap is a response to juror bias, the court should inform the
jury that Congress has enacted statutory caps in response to a consistent
tendency of the jury to overestimate the amount of punitive and noneconomic damages. A straightforward acknowledgment of this tendency
could lead jurors to recognize it and be more thoughtful in addressing it.
If the caps result from a political compromise, the jury could be
informed that the statutory maximum is not meant as an endpoint on a
scale. By informing a jury that they have a damage cap, but that the cap
is not reflective of any Congressional value judgment about juries’
damage awards, it might deflate any scaling effects that the number may
have. It could also be that the caps were enacted based primarily on a
221
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fear that higher awards would potentially cripple employers
economically.225 If this fear was the driving force behind the caps, jurors
should be informed of this policy judgment along with the caps.
Informed jurors would then be more sensitive to potential economic
harm and might adjust their verdicts based on this Congressional policy.
Of course, the legislative history does not tell us exactly why
Congress enacted the current caps. But Congress could make clear for
the future, either in a statutory statement of policy or even in proposed
jury instructions, exactly what policy concerns the caps reflect. Instead
of presuming that jurors cannot handle the truth, Congress should use the
caps as an opportunity to direct the jury toward a proper level of
damages. Congress might even conclude that because a more informed
jury is better able to handle its responsibilities, it could eventually loosen
the cap.
Proponents of non-disclosure might object that an attempt to
provide a tighter framework for compensatory and punitive awards
might impair the “integrity” of the jury’s damages determination.226
While the notion of the “integrity” or “purity” of the jury’s verdict is an
appealing one, it has several flaws. First, while non-disclosure of the cap
is meant to respect the integrity of the jury’s determination, the cap itself
is a direct attack on that integrity. The cap represents a determination
that the jury cannot be trusted with unfettered discretion to award
damages. As one commentator, a proponent of non-disclosure, noted:
“Statutory caps reflect legislative conclusions that juries are ill-prepared
to make the inexact estimations inherent in the assessment of
It is hypocritical to be touting the
noneconomic damages.”227
importance of the jury’s unadulterated verdict immediately before that
verdict is chopped down to a pre-set statutory limit.
Second, not all information taints a jury’s verdict. Obviously,
jurors need information in order to determine damages, and the relevance
or propriety of different types of information to that determination is
often hotly contested. The damage caps are arguably irrelevant to a
determination of the proper level of damages, since damages are
generally determined based on facts related to the case. However, the
caps do represent a Congressional determination about the maximum
225
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level of damages for which any employer is potentially liable.
Moreover, the caps themselves reflect a Congressional intent to reduce
potential liability for small companies, and to provide a gradation based
on the number of employees. To this extent, the caps are plainly quite
relevant, as they reflect Congressional policy choices. Awareness of
these choices could be useful to the jury in making its damages
determination.
V
CONCLUSION
Congress deployed the damage cap non-disclosure provision in
the 1991 Civil Rights Act with little overt consideration of its
ramifications. In their thumbnail analyses of this provision, courts have
come to widely divergent conclusions about its purpose and effects. We
conclude that disclosure of the cap would likely affect juror decisionmaking processes: most probably, smaller awards would rise and larger
awards would fall. However, to focus solely on these effects ignores the
larger impact that non-disclosure has on the judicial system itself. In
light of research about the importance of procedural justice, we argue
that concealing the cap has the potential to undermine the integrity and
legitimacy of the jury system.
The best answer to the damage cap disclosure dilemma is to
provide juries with more complete knowledge of the caps and their
context.
Namely, rather than expressly preventing courts from
disclosing the existence of the damage caps, Congress should mandate
disclosure in the context of fuller instructions about damage
determinations. Although jurors are indeed likely to be influenced by
exposure to the cap, this result stems in part from the dearth of any other
relevant or guiding information provided to jurors about calculating
damages. Disclosure and additional contextual background will lead to
more rational damage determinations. And perhaps more importantly, it
will help to protect and promote perceptions that our justice system is
legitimate, and fair.
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